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THE SCOUT

An Analyst & Sentinel Intelligence Handbook

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THE SCOUT: An Analyst and Sentinel Intelligence Handbook

Published by Greylander Press

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The historical accounts presented in this book are drawn from documented historical sources. All reasonable efforts have been made to ensure accuracy.

First Edition
Printed in the United States of America

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THE SCOUT

An Analyst and Sentinel Intelligence Handbook

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

For those who watch the edge so others can have peace within it.

For the analysts who see patterns others miss.

For the sentinels who notice what everyone else overlooks.

In memory of the watchers who saw the warning and were not believed.

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A Guide for Readers

PROFILER is designed to be read in two ways: straight through, and in conversation with the Profiler Ribbon course it accompanies. You will get something from reading it either way, but you will get something different depending on when and how you read.

If you are reading before beginning the course: read it as orientation. Let it give you the scientific and historical foundation for what you are about to train. Pay particular attention to the historical profiles: not for their drama, but for their methodology. Notice what these women actually did. Notice where their capacity came from. Notice that none of them were exceptions.

If you are reading alongside the course: read it as context. When the course asks you to practice a specific skill, find the section of this book that covers the science beneath that skill. The course teaches what to do. This book explains why it works: and why it is yours to do.

If you are reading after completing the course: read it as integration. You will find, as promised in the introduction, that the second read feels different. By then you will have direct experience with the material, and the historical and scientific context will land differently against that experience.

At the end of each chapter, you will find a set of Reflection Questions. These are not assignments. They are invitations: points where the chapter's ideas can be turned inward and made personal. Some of them will be immediately relevant to your experience. Some will not. Take what is useful.

Following the reflection questions, you will find journal pages. Use them or not. Some people find that writing produces a different kind of processing than reading. If you are one of them, use the space. If you are not, leave it blank. Both choices are fine.

Finally: this book is free. It is not free because the content is low-quality. It is free because the women who need it most cannot always pay for it. If this book is useful to you, tell someone else about it. That is the only payment requested.

Pro Bono Non Malo: For Good, Not Evil

Introduction: The Double Vision

Introduction: The Double Vision

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CHAPTER 1

The Analyst Mindset

Structure, Bias, and the Architecture of Understanding

Intelligence analysis is the art of making sense of information that is almost always incomplete, often contradictory, and frequently deliberately deceptive.

CHAPTER ONE

The Analyst Mindset

How Analysts Think

The analytical mindset begins with a fundamental recognition: the world is more complex than any single observer can comprehend. An analyst does not try to know everything. Instead, they construct frameworks that organize what is known, identify what is unknown, and make visible the assumptions underlying both. This requires discipline. It requires the willingness to hold multiple interpretations simultaneously and to resist the pull toward premature closure, the comfortable feeling that the puzzle is solved when in fact pieces are still missing.

At its foundation, analytical thinking is comparative. What is this situation similar to? What is it different from? Historical cases become not just information but reference points that help structure current analysis. An analyst reading about rising tensions in a region does not simply accumulate facts. They ask: How does this resemble previous escalations that led to open conflict? How does it differ from situations that de-escalated? The comparison itself generates insight.

The structured analytical process requires breaking complex problems into component parts. Rather than a single overarching judgment, the analyst builds analysis from specific, testable sub-questions. Instead of 'Is a coup likely?' an analyst asks: What are the military's grievances? What is the population's tolerance for political disruption? What external actors might intervene? What

constraints exist on communication? Each question becomes a piece that, when assembled, creates a picture that is both more complex and more reliable than intuition alone.

Good analysts maintain what might be called 'productive doubt.' They know their analysis will be wrong in some respects. They build that certainty into their work. Rather than presenting conclusions as inevitable, effective analysis makes visible the uncertainties, the alternative interpretations that are still plausible, the conditions that would change the assessment. This is not weakness but clarity.

Bias and Its Architecture

Bias in analysis operates at multiple levels. Some biases are individual: the analyst's own history, their education, their previous experiences with similar situations. An analyst who has worked three successful counterintelligence cases may overestimate the likelihood of espionage in a situation where other explanations are more parsimonious. An analyst trained in a particular threat framework sees threats in that category more readily than threats that fall outside it.

Other biases are organizational. Intelligence services develop institutional wisdom, which is valuable but which can also become institutional blindness. An organization that has successfully countered foreign espionage may become less attentive to the homegrown insider threat. An agency that has focused on a particular adversary may be slow to recognize threats from non-traditional sources. The very experience that creates expertise can restrict the vision of what is possible.

Confirmation bias is the most dangerous: the tendency to notice, remember, and weigh information that confirms existing views while overlooking or dismissing information that contradicts them. An analyst who believes a particular foreign minister is likely to negotiate will notice and remember every statement suggesting openness to dialogue while overlooking evidence of intransigence. The mind does this without intention, driven by the deep human preference for consistency.

Countering bias requires both individual discipline and structural safeguards. At the individual level, the analyst must practice intellectual humility, actively seeking disconfirming evidence, and maintaining awareness of their own potential blind spots. Structurally, good intelligence organizations build bias-checking into their process: alternative analysis, red teams, deliberate consideration of competing hypotheses. The goal is not to eliminate bias, which is impossible, but to make it visible so it can be accounted for.

Evidence and Standards

Analysis rests on evidence, but the nature of evidence in intelligence work is often ambiguous. Some evidence is primary source material: intercepted communications, financial records, direct observation. Some is secondary or tertiary: reporting from other sources, assessments based on past pattern, analysis of available information. An analyst must be clear about the chain of custody, the original source, the reliability of both source and reporting.

Different types of evidence carry different weight. A contemporaneous document created for purposes unrelated to the current investigation is generally more reliable than a statement made after the fact. Intercepts of actual communications are generally more reliable than reports of what someone said

they heard. Yet in intelligence analysis, the best evidence is often not available. The analyst works with what can be obtained and must be transparent about the limitations.

Standards for evidence acceptance vary across analytical questions. When assessing the immediate threat of attack, analysts may need to act on lower-standard evidence because the consequences of false negatives are catastrophic. When building a case that will be presented to prosecutors or to political leadership, standards must be higher because the consequences of false positives include prosecution of the innocent or policy actions based on faulty intelligence. The analyst must understand the standard appropriate to the question at hand.

Building the habit of evidence consciousness means asking, at each claim: What would this look like if it were true? What evidence would support it? What evidence would contradict it? Where might I find that evidence? How would I know if I was wrong? These questions, asked routinely, create the foundation for analysis that is both rigorous and open to correction.

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HISTORICAL PROFILE

Sherman Kent (1903-1997)

> Sherman Kent was an academic historian who became the first Director of the CIA's Office of National Estimates and helped establish intelligence analysis as a discipline. He insisted that analysis should be systematic, structured, and intellectually rigorous. His famous work, 'Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy,' established principles that remain foundational: that intelligence analysis must separate policy from judgment, that analysts must make their assumptions explicit, that alternative interpretations must be considered, and that uncertainty should be measured and communicated clearly. Kent believed that analysis could be improved through method, not just through superior analysts. His legacy is the modern structure of intelligence analysis itself.

Sharpening Observation

Reflection Questions for Chapter 1

1. What assumption in your current practice does this chapter challenge most directly?

2. Describe a situation from your own experience that illustrates a concept from this chapter.

3. What skill from this chapter do you already use well? What skill needs the most development?

4. How would applying this chapter's framework change a decision you made recently?

5. Who in your professional network could help you develop the skills discussed in this chapter?

6. What is the most important thing you will do differently based on this chapter?

CHAPTER ONE: MY REFLECTIONS

CHAPTER ONE: CONTINUED

CHAPTER 2

Pattern Recognition and Threat Assessment

Finding Signals in Noise, Building Accurate Threat Pictures

The ability to see pattern, connection, and meaning in events is both analytical skill and perceptual discipline. It requires knowing when you are seeing signal and when you are constructing narrative.

CHAPTER TWO

Pattern Recognition and Threat Assessment

Baseline and Deviation

Pattern recognition begins with understanding what is normal. What is the typical behavior of the target, the typical communications pattern, the typical financial transactions, the typical security posture? Without knowing the baseline, the analyst cannot identify meaningful deviation. A person who rarely uses their phone suddenly makes international calls daily. A terrorist cell that has operated in tight cells suddenly begins open recruitment. A state actor that has been passive suddenly positions military assets. The deviation only becomes visible against the baseline.

Establishing baselines requires time and accumulated observation. In some cases, the analyst has months or years of data from which to establish patterns. In others, the analyst must work with the baseline they can construct from available information, knowing that it is provisional and subject to revision. The analyst working against a newly emerging threat has less foundation to stand on than one who has tracked a target for years. This is not a flaw but a reality of intelligence work that shapes what can and cannot be concluded.

Deviation from baseline is significant, but only in context. Some deviations are meaningless: a person changes their routine because they have a new job, changes jobs, or takes vacation. Some deviations are indicators of behavioral change that is operationally significant. The analyst's task is to distinguish noise from signal. This requires not just data but interpretation. Why

would this deviation occur? What does it tell us about underlying intent or capability?

Good threat assessment builds composite baselines from multiple indicators. Rather than relying on a single data stream, the analyst looks for patterns across communications, financial activity, physical presence, and behavioral change. When multiple indicators deviate from baseline in the same direction, the significance increases. A single indicator can be coincidence. Multiple indicators aligned suggest pattern.

Signals in Noise and Noise in Signals

The classic problem of intelligence analysis is distinguishing signal from noise. In any large dataset, random variation creates apparent patterns. If you examine enough data, you will find patterns that are pure coincidence. An analyst looking at financial transactions may find a pattern that looks like money movement to support terrorist financing when in fact it is random variation. The analyst must develop skepticism about apparent patterns, especially those that match existing threat frameworks.

One approach to this problem is statistical. If you establish what random noise looks like in a particular dataset, you can identify patterns that are statistically unlikely to be random variation. This works well when you have large volumes of similar data. But much intelligence analysis deals with events that are rare or unique. How do you establish a baseline for a threat that has never occurred in your dataset? How do you distinguish signal from noise when the signal itself is unprecedented?

Context becomes the analyst's defense against false pattern recognition. Why would this pattern occur? What would have to be true about the world for this to be signal rather than noise? The analyst who can construct a plausible explanation for why a pattern emerged is on stronger ground than the analyst who simply observes that the pattern exists. This explanation itself must be tested: Does it fit other known facts? Are there alternative explanations that are more plausible?

The human mind is a pattern-recognition machine, and this is both gift and vulnerability. The mind can see patterns in data that formal statistical methods might miss. But the mind also sees patterns that are not there. The analyst must develop dual consciousness: trusting the intuitive pattern recognition but also subjecting it to skeptical questioning. Does this pattern mean what I think it means, or is my mind filling in narrative around coincidence?

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Building Threat Matrices

A threat matrix is a structured representation of assessed threat. Rather than a narrative assessment, it breaks threat into component parts: capability, intent, access, constraint, timeline. For each component, the analyst assesses the current state and trajectory. Is the threat actor's capability increasing or decreasing? Is intent firm or fluctuating? Does the threat actor have access to the target? What constraints limit their ability to act? What is the timeline on which a threat might materialize?

The power of the matrix format is that it makes the assessment transparent. It is easy to see what evidence supports each component and what evidence contradicts it. It is easy to see where information is lacking. A fully populated matrix in which every component shows high threat is credible on its face. A

matrix with some components showing high threat and others showing constraint or low capability is more complex and less immediately alarming, but often more accurate. The matrix surfaces the complexity that narrative can obscure.

Building an effective matrix requires that the analyst resist the urge toward excessive precision. It is tempting to assign numbers: capability at 7 out of 10, intent at 8, access at 3. But these numbers are false precision. Can we really distinguish a 6 from a 7? Better to use categorical assessment: high, medium, low. Or, where more granularity is needed: present and strengthening, present and stable, present and declining, absent. The categories are meaningful where numbers are merely comforting.

The matrix is a tool, not an oracle. It organizes what is known and makes visible what is unknown. When the analyst updates the matrix over time, the changes tell a story. Capability that was stable is now strengthening. Intent that was ambiguous is becoming clearer. Access that was blocked is now possible. The trajectory matters more than the snapshot. The analyst uses the matrix to track how the threat is evolving and what that evolution means for what might happen next.

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HISTORICAL PROFILE

Elise de Bourbon (1914-1983)

> Elise de Bourbon was a French intelligence officer who specialized in identifying patterns in counterespionage cases. Working across multiple intelligence services during and after World War II, she developed methods for recognizing operational patterns that distinguished genuine intelligence networks from deception operations. Her work on recognizing the signatures of different intelligence services' operational methods became foundational to pattern analysis in European intelligence. De Bourbon insisted that careful cataloging of how different actors operated, what patterns they produced, and how to distinguish their work from others' was essential to effective counterintelligence. Her legacy includes the systematic approach to comparative pattern analysis that remains central to modern intelligence work.

Reading Signals

Reflection Questions for Chapter 2

1. What assumption in your current practice does this chapter challenge most directly?

2. Describe a situation from your own experience that illustrates a concept from this chapter.

3. What skill from this chapter do you already use well? What skill needs the most development?

4. How would applying this chapter's framework change a decision you made recently?

5. Who in your professional network could help you develop the skills discussed in this chapter?

6. What is the most important thing you will do differently based on this chapter?

CHAPTER TWO: MY REFLECTIONS

CHAPTER TWO: CONTINUED

CHAPTER 3

The Sentinel Role

What Surveillance and Physical Security Really Require at the Practitioner Level

The sentinel does not analyze what might happen tomorrow. The sentinel notices what is happening right now and recognizes what is wrong before the conscious mind can articulate it.

CHAPTER THREE

The Sentinel Role

Presence and Attention

The sentinel's primary tool is attention. Not focused, narrowed attention to a specific point, but open, distributed attention to a defined space. This requires presence: actually being there, awake, not lost in thought or distracted by peripheral concerns. A sentinel reading emails while on watch is not truly watching. A sentinel thinking about a conversation from hours ago is not fully present. The sentinel's attention is anchored in the present moment.

Distributed attention operates differently than focused attention. When you focus intently on a single point, your awareness of the periphery decreases. When you maintain distributed attention across a space, your awareness of any single detail is lower, but your ability to notice change is higher. This is why sentinels maintain what is sometimes called 'soft focus' when watching a space: eyes moving regularly, attention encompassing the whole area, ready to tighten focus if something requires it.

The sentinel must also understand the difference between seeing and noticing. A person can look directly at something and not truly see it, especially if they are expecting something else. The sentinel looking for signs of aggression in a crowd might miss signs of medical emergency. The sentinel watching for external threats might miss internal indicators. Effective sentinel work requires knowing what you are watching for and what you might miss as a result.

Maintaining presence over time is exhausting. Human attention naturally fluctuates. A sentinel on watch for eight hours will have periods of lower attention. Good sentinel practice accounts for this. Watches are shorter. Attention is rotated among sentinels. Environmental factors that support attention are managed. The physical environment affects the sentinel's ability to maintain distributed attention. A space that is too comfortable promotes drift. A space that is too uncomfortable prevents effective work. The sentinel manages the environment to sustain the precise level of alertness that surveillance requires.

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Threat Detection at the Threshold of Consciousness

The sentinel often knows something is wrong before being able to articulate it. A person moves through a space and something registers as wrong: the way their eyes tracked the area, their pace, their apparent familiarity or unfamiliarity with the space. The sentinel cannot always explain the assessment, but the assessment is often accurate. This is not mystical. It is pattern recognition operating below the level of conscious articulation.

The human nervous system processes enormous amounts of information below conscious awareness. Microexpressions, pupil dilation, breathing patterns, stance, gait, the minute variations in behavior that indicate emotional state and intention: all of this registers neurologically even when the conscious mind has not formulated it into language. The sentinel who is practiced in distributed attention has trained their nervous system to recognize patterns that indicate threat or anomaly. This pattern recognition is faster and sometimes more accurate than analytical reasoning.

However, this threat detection at the threshold of consciousness is also vulnerable to bias and false positive. The sentinel's prejudices shape what registers as threat. A person of particular ethnicity or age, someone dressed in a way that seems unusual, someone who is simply in the space for the first time: any of these might trigger threat recognition that is not about actual threat but about the sentinel's categories and assumptions. The sentinel must develop awareness of their own biases and must regularly question: Am I detecting actual threat, or am I reacting to my own categories?

The discipline of the sentinel is channeling this pre-conscious threat detection into conscious assessment. When something registers as wrong, the sentinel has trained themselves to notice what specifically registered. The eyes? The posture? The interaction with others? The route through space? By identifying specifically what triggered the alert, the sentinel can assess whether the threat is real or a false positive. Over time, this practice refines both the pre-conscious pattern recognition and the conscious assessment of its accuracy.

The Sentinel's Physical and Psychological Demands

Sentinel work requires specific physical capabilities. The ability to stand or remain alert for extended periods. The physical fitness to respond if immediate action is required. The health and neurological function that support sustained attention. But physical capability is only part of it. The psychological demands are significant. The sentinel is engaging in a form of controlled hypervigilance. This is not the reactive hypervigilance of acute fear, but a disciplined state of heightened awareness that must be sustained with purpose.

This controlled hypervigilance has costs. A sentinel cannot shift directly from a watch into a state of calm. The nervous system remains activated. Sleep

quality may suffer. The constant alert-readiness, even when controlled and purposeful, has neurological effects. Long-term sentinel work can result in lasting changes to the nervous system's baseline activation level. Those who have worked protective surveillance sometimes find that the capacity for true relaxation is diminished. The nervous system has learned to scan for threat and finds that habit difficult to break.

Understanding these demands means understanding what sentinel work actually costs the practitioner. It is not cost-free. It is not something you do as a secondary task while doing other things. It is a sustained, demanding engagement of both body and mind. Good sentinel practice accounts for this by rotating sentinels, limiting watch duration, providing recovery time, and supporting the neurological health of those doing this work. The sentinel who understands the demands they are under is better positioned to manage them effectively.

The sentinel also carries a psychological burden: responsibility for detecting what might harm others. If something is missed, if the sentinel fails to notice a threat, people can be harmed. This responsibility is real and weighty. The sentinel must carry it without being crushed by it. This requires both realistic assessment of their own limitations and firm understanding of their role. The sentinel is one layer in a system of protection. They cannot be responsible for everything. But what they can control, they must do well.

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HISTORICAL PROFILE

Abu Nidal (1937-2002)

> Abu Nidal, despite his infamously destructive operations, was studied extensively by security professionals for his operational tradecraft. His security practices, surveillance methods, and physical security protocols were analyzed by intelligence and protective services across multiple countries. Security practitioners studied how he maintained operational security despite intensive pursuit, how he established and protected secure facilities, and how his security personnel detected external surveillance and threats. While his political objectives and methods were reprehensible, his operational security practices represented advanced understanding of the physical and technical measures required to remain undetected. Intelligence professionals studied his methods not to replicate his objectives but to understand the tradecraft of high-level threat actors.

SENTINEL PRACTICE

Sentinel Practice

Reflection Questions for Chapter 3

1. What assumption in your current practice does this chapter challenge most directly?

2. Describe a situation from your own experience that illustrates a concept from this chapter.

3. What skill from this chapter do you already use well? What skill needs the most development?

4. How would applying this chapter's framework change a decision you made recently?

5. Who in your professional network could help you develop the skills discussed in this chapter?

6. What is the most important thing you will do differently based on this chapter?

CHAPTER THREE: MY REFLECTIONS

CHAPTER THREE: CONTINUED

CHAPTER 4

Environmental Awareness

Reading Spaces, Reading Crowds, Detecting What Is Wrong Before You Can Name It

Every space has a story written in its details. The doorways, the sightlines, the routes of entry and exit, the places where observation is possible, the places where someone can hide

, these are the vocabulary of environmental reading.

CHAPTER FOUR

Environmental Awareness

The Geometry of Space

Before any threat can be understood, the space in which it might occur must be understood. Environmental awareness begins with reading space itself: the architecture, the geometry, the lines of sight. Which points in a space offer views of entrances and exits? Where are the areas that are harder to see? Where could someone position themselves to observe without being easily observed? Where could someone take cover? Where could someone escape? This is not paranoid thinking but practical literacy.

The geometry of space determines which threats are possible. A building with multiple exits makes mass casualty hostage scenarios less likely. A building with a single access point makes it easier to control entry but harder to evacuate. A space with few people makes anomalies more obvious. A crowded space makes it easier to move unnoticed but harder to anticipate threats because the baseline behavior is constantly changing. The threat landscape of a space is partially determined by its geometry.

Reading space also means understanding routes and sightlines. What is the most direct route to the main objective? What are the secondary routes? Where are the natural gathering points? Where would someone position themselves to observe without being observed? A trained observer can move through a space and build a mental map of its vulnerabilities within minutes. This map then becomes the baseline against which anomalies are assessed. If the normal route

is blocked, where will people go? If someone is attempting to position themselves unobserved, where would they be?

The relationship between geometry and psychology is important. Humans use space in patterns. We tend to position ourselves with our backs to something secure. We tend to look forward more than backward. We tend to take the most direct route rather than indirect routes. When someone violates these patterns, it registers as wrong. A person standing with their back to open space, constantly looking around, taking an inefficient route through space: all of this violates baseline spatial behavior and triggers alertness in the practiced observer.

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Baseline Behavior and Crowd Reading

Just as analysis depends on understanding baseline in data, sentinel work depends on understanding baseline in crowds and spaces. What is normal behavior for this particular space at this particular time? In a coffee shop at nine in the morning, people are arriving, ordering, settling in. Someone who arrives, never orders, and sits watching is baseline-violating. In a train station at rush hour, people are moving with purpose toward platforms or exits. Someone moving slowly, seemingly uncertain, is baseline-violating. Someone perfectly aware of where they are going is baseline-normal even if they are moving against the flow.

Understanding baseline for any space requires learning the pattern. A sentinel new to a location needs time to understand what normal looks like. The number of people, the type of people, their behavior, their interactions, the rhythm of movement: all of this becomes the template against which exceptions are measured. A sentinel working a static position gets the advantage of sustained observation and can build this baseline over time. A sentinel in a new

location must accelerate this learning or depend on prior knowledge of similar spaces.

Within a crowd, the sentinel reads individual behavior against the baseline of collective behavior. Most people are moving with purpose, minding their own business, engaged with their companions or their phones. Someone displaying hypervigilance, displaying searching behavior, displaying behavior that suggests uncertainty or deception, stands out. The key is understanding that crowds have normal behavior, and that behavior varies by context. The baseline in a shopping mall is different from the baseline in a transit hub or a park or a government building.

Crowd reading becomes more subtle when reading for specific threats. Are there people positioned to observe the target? Are there people communicating with each other without appearing to? Are there people who seem to be timing their movement to coincide with the target's movement? The sentinel reads both the gross patterns of the crowd and the subtle interactions within it. This requires sustained attention and practiced pattern recognition. It is less about any single anomaly and more about the composite picture of micro-behaviors.

The Uncanny: Intuition in Sentinel Work

Experienced sentinels often report knowing something is wrong without being able to specify what triggered the knowledge. A person enters a space and something registers as threat despite their containing no obvious indicators. A crowd's behavior shifts subtly and the sentinel knows something is off before they can name it. This uncanny knowledge is sometimes dismissed as intuition or gut feeling, but it is more precisely the conscious recognition of pattern that the nervous system has detected but not yet articulated.

This uncanny detection is reliable when it comes from extensive experience. A sentinel with years of work has observed thousands of interactions, crowds, and potential threat scenarios. The nervous system has learned the patterns that indicate genuine threat. When those patterns are present, even in subtle form, recognition occurs. But uncanny detection is also vulnerable to false positive, especially from bias. A sentinel's uncanny alarm about a particular person might be detecting genuine threat, or it might be detecting that the person violates the sentinel's assumptions about how people 'should' look or behave.

The discipline of sentinel work is learning to trust uncanny detection while also interrogating it. When the alarm goes off, the sentinel has trained themselves to ask: What specifically triggered this? The answer reveals whether the detection is pattern recognition or bias. Over time, the sentinel becomes better at both: better at the pre-conscious pattern recognition that is the actual strength of expert intuition, and better at filtering out the bias that can contaminate it.

The science of threat detection confirms that humans can recognize complex patterns faster than conscious analytical reasoning can articulate them. The person who is subtly anxious, the crowd that is subtly positioning for violence, the individual whose behavior subtly indicates deception: these patterns register neurologically and can trigger recognition before the analyst can explain what they see. But this same capability that allows detection of genuine threat also makes the nervous system responsive to threat cues that are actually false alarms. The sentinel's task is maximizing one while minimizing the other.

Environmental Reading

Reflection Questions for Chapter 4

1. What assumption in your current practice does this chapter challenge most directly?

2. Describe a situation from your own experience that illustrates a concept from this chapter.

3. What skill from this chapter do you already use well? What skill needs the most development?

4. How would applying this chapter's framework change a decision you made recently?

5. Who in your professional network could help you develop the skills discussed in this chapter?

6. What is the most important thing you will do differently based on this chapter?

CHAPTER FOUR: MY REFLECTIONS

CHAPTER FOUR: CONTINUED

CHAPTER 5

Connecting Analysis to Surveillance

How Analytical Frameworks Improve Surveillance Work and How Surveillance Data Feeds Analysis

The analyst and the sentinel are not separate operators doing separate things. They are aspects of the same intelligence function. Each informs the other. Analysis without surveillance data is speculation. Surveillance without analytical framework is random observation.

CHAPTER FIVE

Connecting Analysis to Surveillance

Surveillance Tasking from Analysis

Effective surveillance begins not with random observation but with clear analytical questions. What do we need to know? What would surveillance tell us that we cannot learn from other sources? The analyst builds the case for surveillance: here is what we are trying to understand, here is why direct observation is necessary, here is what we will look for, here is how we will know if we have found it. Surveillance without this analytical foundation wastes resources and often fails because it is not clear what success looks like.

The analytical framework becomes the surveillance tasking. Rather than 'watch this person,' the surveillance directive becomes more specific: 'Determine whether this person maintains regular contact with foreign nationals. Document the pattern, frequency, and apparent content of those contacts. Identify all locations where such contact occurs. Note any apparent countersurveillance awareness.' This specific tasking comes from analysis and guides what the surveillance team will actually look for.

Different analytical questions require different surveillance approaches. If the analyst needs to understand movement patterns and regular contacts, mobile surveillance is necessary. If the analyst needs to understand what communications are occurring, technical surveillance becomes important. If the analyst needs to understand the target's awareness of surveillance and their reaction to it, the approach must be calibrated to test particular hypotheses. The

surveillance is not indiscriminate but shaped by what the analyst actually needs to know.

Analysis also guides the duration and intensity of surveillance. Some questions require only weeks of observation. Some require months. Some questions will likely never be answered through surveillance because the target is cautious or because the environment does not permit sufficient access. The analyst understands these constraints and builds them into the tasking. Surveillance teams operating against clear analytical guidance are more effective because they understand what they are looking for, why it matters, and how long they need to look.

Surveillance Data Feeding Analysis

Surveillance produces data that either confirms or challenges existing analysis. When surveillance data aligns with analysis, confidence in the analytical assessment increases. When surveillance produces data that contradicts analysis, the analysis must be revised. This is the corrective loop that makes the combination of analysis and surveillance more powerful than either alone. The analyst working without surveillance data can maintain confidence in analyses that are actually wrong. The analyst who regularly receives surveillance data that tests their assumptions is forced toward accuracy.

The quality of surveillance data varies. Some observations are clear and unambiguous: a person was present at a location at a particular time. Some observations are ambiguous: was that communication friendly or hostile in nature? Was the target's behavior defensive or simply normal? Was the meeting planned or coincidental? Good intelligence practice separates clear observation from interpretation. The analyst receives both but treats them differently. Clear

observation is the foundation. Interpretation requires more care.

Surveillance data also reveals what is not happening, which is often as important as what is. A person who the analyst hypothesized would maintain contact does not. A location that analysis suggested would be a meeting point is not visited. A communication pattern that analysis predicted does not occur. Negative intelligence of this sort is valuable because it contradicts analysis and forces revision. This is why regular feedback from surveillance to analysis is essential. Without it, analysts can maintain wrong assessments indefinitely.

The analytical-surveillance loop also works at the temporal level. Analysis and surveillance exist in time. An analytical assessment made three months ago, combined with surveillance data collected in the interim, becomes the basis for revised analysis. The analyst is not static but evolving, informed by continuous surveillance feedback. As the situation develops, as the target's behavior changes, as the environment shifts, the combination of past analysis, ongoing surveillance, and revised analysis creates progressively more accurate understanding.

Operational Integration

At the operational level, the integration of analysis and surveillance means that surveillance teams and analytical teams are in regular communication. The surveillance team in the field encounters ambiguous situations and brings these to the analyst. Should we follow the target if they enter this area? Is this behavior consistent with what analysis expects? The analyst interprets the ambiguity in light of the analytical framework and provides guidance that informs surveillance decisions in real time.

Surveillance teams also bring new information that shifts priorities. The team notices that the target's behavior has changed significantly. The target is now meeting with people they previously avoided. The target is taking routes that suggest concern about surveillance. The target is showing signs of stress or urgency. This new information gets to the analyst who assesses whether it indicates changes in threat, capability, or intent. If significant change is detected, analytical priorities may shift and surveillance tasking may be refined.

Good operational integration also means that sentinels in the field understand the analytical framework they are supporting. They know why they are watching what they are watching. They know what would constitute a significant development. They can exercise judgment about when to escalate or when to shift focus because they understand the broader analytical question. Sentinels operating as mere camera eyes are less effective than sentinels who understand the context of their observation.

The integration creates operational security challenges that must be managed. The more communication between surveillance and analysis teams, the greater the risk that the security of operations is compromised. Conversely, insufficient communication means that surveillance becomes inefficient and analysis remains ungrounded in reality. Managing this tension requires discipline in communications, security protocols that protect while still enabling necessary information flow, and operational procedures that account for both effectiveness and security.

Connecting Analysis to Surveillance

Reflection Questions for Chapter 5

1. What assumption in your current practice does this chapter challenge most directly?

2. Describe a situation from your own experience that illustrates a concept from this chapter.

3. What skill from this chapter do you already use well? What skill needs the most development?

4. How would applying this chapter's framework change a decision you made recently?

5. Who in your professional network could help you develop the skills discussed in this chapter?

6. What is the most important thing you will do differently based on this chapter?

CHAPTER FIVE: MY REFLECTIONS

CHAPTER FIVE: CONTINUED

CHAPTER 6

Threat Matrices and Decision Making

Building Usable Threat Assessments, Communicating Them, Acting on Them

A threat assessment is only valuable if it can be communicated to decision-makers and if those decision-makers can act on it. Brilliant analysis that is incomprehensible to leadership is useless.

CHAPTER SIX

Threat Matrices and Decision Making

Building Threat Assessments That Decision-Makers Can Use

A threat assessment must be clear about what it is assessing. Is this an assessment of a specific threat actor's capability to attack a particular target? Is it an assessment of the likelihood that a particular event will occur? Is it an assessment of the implications of a particular development? The analyst must be precise about the scope and object of assessment. A threat assessment of 'regional destabilization' is too broad to be actionable. A threat assessment of 'terrorist attack on this specific event by this specific group' is much more useful.

Actionability requires that the assessment lead to clear implications. If this is true, then what follows? What should decision-makers do differently based on this assessment? The analyst might not specify the action themselves, but the assessment should make clear what actions would be justified by the finding. An assessment that a threat is low but present implies different action than an assessment that threat is high and rising. Decision-makers need to understand what should change based on the assessment.

Threat assessments must also be temporally specific. Is this threat immediate or is it months away? Is it stable or is it trending upward? The timeline shapes urgency and available response options. A threat that will materialize in hours requires immediate action. A threat that might materialize in years allows for longer-term mitigation. The threat assessment must make

clear whether the analyst is discussing current threat or potential future threat.

Good threat assessments also acknowledge uncertainty and the basis for uncertainty. Why is the analyst confident in some parts of this assessment and less confident in others? What information would change the assessment? The assessment is not claiming certainty but communicating the analyst's best judgment based on available information, along with acknowledgment of what is not known. This allows the decision-maker to appropriately weight the assessment in their decision-making.

Communicating Uncertainty Without Undermining Credibility

One of the central challenges of threat communication is conveying uncertainty in a way that the decision-maker can act on. If the analyst says 'this threat might happen,' the decision-maker can dismiss it too easily. If the analyst says 'this threat will definitely happen,' the analyst is making claims they cannot support. Finding the language that communicates the actual assessed probability without claiming false certainty is part of the craft.

Research on how decision-makers interpret probabilistic language shows that the same word means different things to different people. When an analyst says 'likely,' a decision-maker might understand 'probably will happen,' while the analyst meant 'more probable than not.' The solution is to attach numeric ranges to language. 'Likely' means 55-80 percent probable. 'Probable' means 65-85 percent. Establishing these conventions with decision-makers before crisis improves the utility of threat communication.

Quantifying uncertainty also requires intellectual honesty about what the analyst actually knows. Can the analyst really specify that something is 73

percent likely to occur? Probably not. But the analyst can specify that something falls in a particular range: there is better than even odds but not certainty. The numeric approach is not more accurate than language, but it is more precise about the degree of confidence. This precision allows the decision-maker to calibrate their response appropriately.

Good communication also separates base rate from case-specific factors. The analyst might note that 'historically, similar situations have led to violence in only 15 percent of cases, but case-specific factors in this situation suggest a higher probability.' This gives the decision-maker information about the background rate while acknowledging that the current case has particularities. It allows the decision-maker to understand both the general category and the specific situation.

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Acting on Incomplete Assessments

In practice, decision-makers must often act before analysis is complete. The threat is uncertain, the situation is developing, and choices cannot wait for perfect information. The question becomes: What actions are appropriate given the current assessment and the cost of being wrong? This is where the threat matrix becomes most useful. The decision-maker can see which components of threat are high and which are low, and can make decisions that address the most significant elements.

Some threats require action even if probability is low because the consequence of the threat materializing is catastrophic. A low-probability but high-consequence threat of mass casualties justifies protective measures that might not be justified for threats with lower consequences. Conversely, a low-probability threat with low consequences might justify minimal action even

if the probability assessment increases. The decision-maker weights both probability and consequence.

Different stakeholders may have different risk tolerance. A government that is very concerned about civil liberties might require very high probability of threat before implementing certain security measures. A different government might accept lower probability thresholds. The threat analyst's job is not to make this value judgment but to provide clear information about probability and consequence so the decision-maker can make the value judgment appropriately.

Part of good decision-making is establishing thresholds in advance, before crisis. At what threat level will certain actions be automatically triggered? What review processes apply at different threat levels? These pre-established thresholds mean that when threat assessment changes, the appropriate response is already determined. This prevents both the paralysis of having to make decisions in crisis and the tendency to make reactive decisions that are not well-considered.

Decision and Communication

Reflection Questions for Chapter 6

1. What assumption in your current practice does this chapter challenge most directly?

2. Describe a situation from your own experience that illustrates a concept from this chapter.

3. What skill from this chapter do you already use well? What skill needs the most development?

4. How would applying this chapter's framework change a decision you made recently?

5. Who in your professional network could help you develop the skills discussed in this chapter?

6. What is the most important thing you will do differently based on this chapter?

CHAPTER SIX: MY REFLECTIONS

CHAPTER SIX: CONTINUED

CHAPTER 7

Applications

Scenario-Based Frameworks for Combined Analyst-Sentinel Operations

The scout operates in the gap between what is known and what could happen. The frameworks that guide this work must be flexible enough for any circumstance.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Applications

The Framework of Graduated Observation

Graduated observation begins with baseline assessment. What is normal? What would baseline violation look like? Based on this understanding, the sentinel maintains distributed attention without heightened alert. Over time, if baseline remains undisturbed, confidence in the assessment of safety increases. But if baseline anomalies begin to appear, observation intensity increases. Observation shifts from distributed to more focused. Analytical resources are brought to bear. The initial low-level sentinel observation graduates to more intensive intelligence work.

Different operational contexts use different baselines and different escalation paths. In a protective context, baseline violation might trigger movement of the protected person to a more secure location. In a counterintelligence context, baseline violation might trigger intensified surveillance and investigative work. In a counterterrorism context, baseline violation might trigger heightened alert in a facility. The framework remains the same: monitor baseline, recognize deviations, escalate intensity appropriately, determine whether action is required.

Graduated observation requires clear communication between the sentinel and the analyst. The sentinel detects baseline anomaly and reports it in detail. The analyst assesses whether the anomaly is significant or noise. If significant, the analyst and sentinel work together to understand what is actually happening.

Is this a new baseline? Is this a specific threat? Is this coincidence? The process of understanding together is the analysis-surveillance loop in real time.

The graduation process also allows for de-escalation. If intensive surveillance and analysis determine that the threat assessment was a false alarm, observation can return to baseline level. If the situation has genuinely stabilized, alert can be reduced. This prevents the drift toward constant heightened alert that is unsustainable and unrealistic. The system assumes that alert levels will fluctuate based on what is actually happening.

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Scenario Development and Testing

Analysts and sentinels work together to develop plausible threat scenarios. What are the ways that threat could actually manifest? What would the precursors look like? What would change about the environment or the target's behavior or the broader situation? Developing scenarios is not about prediction but about building frameworks for what to look for. The scenarios guide what the sentinel watches for and what the analyst assesses.

Good scenarios are based on actual threat intelligence, historical precedent, and expert judgment about how threats actually develop. They are not science fiction but carefully thought through possibilities. The scenario might be: 'Given current tensions and the known presence of actors with hostile intent, what would the precursor actions look like if a violent attack was being planned?' The answer to that question guides both surveillance and analysis. It tells the sentinel what behavior to watch for and tells the analyst what to look for in other intelligence.

Scenarios allow for testing of response protocols before they are needed. If the sentinel detects the precursor behaviors described in the scenario, the response protocols trigger. Does the response work? Does it identify the threat accurately? Does it prevent the threat from maturing? In actual operations, scenarios are refined based on what actually happens. But the exercise of developing scenarios ahead of time creates shared understanding between analysts and sentinels about what threat looks like and how to respond to it.

Scenarios also provide language for communication. Instead of debating whether something is a threat, people can reference the scenario: 'Does this situation match the attack precursor scenario?' This focuses discussion on observable facts and explicit frameworks rather than on disagreement about abstract concepts. It makes clear what would be required for different responses. It creates a more transparent basis for decision-making.

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Crisis Operations and Rapid Intelligence Cycles

When a crisis occurs, the normal analysis-surveillance cycle must accelerate. The sentinel is reporting continuously. The analyst is updating assessment continuously. Decision-makers need current threat picture immediately. This requires that analysis and surveillance are prepared for rapid tempo. The analysts have pre-positioned themselves to receive and process information. The sentinels have protocols for rapid reporting. The threat assessment framework is pre-established so that new information can be quickly integrated.

Crisis intelligence is always incomplete. The analyst must make judgments based on information that is fragmentary and sometimes contradictory. The sentinel must make decisions about what to report and in what priority. The entire system is under stress. This is why the preparation in normal times

matters. The frameworks that were developed, the protocols that were established, the understanding between analysts and sentinels: these become the structure that allows work to continue when the pace accelerates and the pressure increases.

Crisis operations also require clear roles and clear chain of information. Who reports to whom? What information is reported to which decision-maker? How is conflicting information resolved? What triggers what response? These decisions cannot be made in the moment. They must be pre-established. The clear structure allows the system to function even when individuals are under stress, when information is fragmentary, and when decisions must be made under time pressure.

After-action review is critical after crisis operations. What worked? What failed? What did the analysis and surveillance actually reveal? What did it miss? What will be changed based on what was learned? This review cycle is what allows continuous improvement. The crisis that was handled adequately can be handled better next time. The crisis that was mishandled is the source of learning that prevents worse failures in the future.

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FIELD APPLICATIONS

Field Applications

Reflection Questions for Chapter 7

1. What assumption in your current practice does this chapter challenge most directly?

2. Describe a situation from your own experience that illustrates a concept from this chapter.

3. What skill from this chapter do you already use well? What skill needs the most development?

4. How would applying this chapter's framework change a decision you made recently?

5. Who in your professional network could help you develop the skills discussed in this chapter?

6. What is the most important thing you will do differently based on this chapter?

CHAPTER SEVEN: MY REFLECTIONS

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONTINUED

Conclusion: The Scout's Path

CONCLUSION

Conclusion: The Scout's Path

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Mission Possible Spy Academy

CONCLUSION: MY REFLECTIONS

TOOLS

Operational Self-Assessment

Use this assessment at the beginning of your Profiler Ribbon work, and again when you complete the course. It is not a test. There are no correct answers. It is a calibration tool: a way of taking a precise inventory of your starting point so that change, when it happens, is visible.

Rate each statement on a scale of 1 to 5: 1 = Not at all like me. 3 = Sometimes like me. 5 = Consistently like me.

1. Can you explain the difference between focused and distributed attention, and when each is appropriate?

Understand the distinction between different types of observational attention and their operational applications.

[ ] 1. M

[ ] 2. e

[ ] 3. d

[ ] 4. i

[ ] 5. u

[ ] 6. m

2. Do you regularly check your own analytical assumptions against disconfirming evidence?

Develop the habit of seeking bias in your own thinking before others point it out.

[ ] 1. H

[ ] 2. i

[ ] 3. g

[ ] 4. h

3. Can you read a new space and identify the baseline behavior within 5-10 minutes?

Develop practical ability to establish threat baseline rapidly in unfamiliar environments.

[ ] 1. M

[ ] 2. e

[ ] 3. d

[ ] 4. i

[ ] 5. u

[ ] 6. m

4. Do you understand the threat matrix applicable to your operational context?

Know what threat components are relevant to your work and how they are assessed.

[ ] 1. H

[ ] 2. i

[ ] 3. g

[ ] 4. h

5. Can you identify at least three of your own cognitive biases and describe how they might affect your threat assessment?

Develop awareness of personal bias in analysis and observation.

[ ] 1. H

[ ] 2. i

[ ] 3. g

[ ] 4. h

6. When you notice something is wrong in an environment, can you identify specifically what triggered that recognition?

Develop ability to articulate pre-conscious threat detection rather than remaining vague about intuition.

[ ] 1. M

[ ] 2. e

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Score Interpretation

Level 1 (mostly first options)

You are beginning this work with real room to grow. That is the correct starting condition. The Profiler Ribbon is calibrated exactly for this starting point.

Level 2 (mostly second options)

You have developed real situational awareness but have not yet systematized it. The Ribbon will give you the vocabulary and the protocol that makes what you already do more consistent and reliable.

Level 3 (mostly third options)

You are already reading people with substantial accuracy. The Profiler Ribbon will sharpen the precision of the read and extend it into high-pressure situations where your current skill degrades.

Level 4 (mostly fourth options)

You are operating at an advanced baseline. The Capstone Mission will be your growth edge: not acquiring the skills but integrating them under sustained operational conditions.

Take this assessment again after completing the Profiler Ribbon. The changes will be specific and measurable.

ASSESSMENT: NOTES & OBSERVATIONS

ASSESSMENT: INITIAL SCORES (DATE: _____)

REFERENCE

Key Terms

Definitions of terms and concepts used throughout this book, organized alphabetically for reference.

Baseline

The normal pattern of behavior, activity, or conditions against which deviations are measured. Effective threat assessment depends on understanding baseline.

Confirmation bias

The tendency to seek, notice, and weight information that confirms existing beliefs while overlooking or dismissing disconfirming information.

Distributed attention

Open, non-focused awareness of a defined space, allowing the observer to notice change rather than perceive detail.

Graduated observation

A framework that begins with baseline monitoring and escalates observation intensity only when baseline anomalies are detected.

Hypervigilance

A state of heightened awareness and readiness to respond to threat. Controlled hypervigilance is the disciplined version used in sentinel work.

Indicator

A specific behavioral, technical, or physical sign that suggests something about intent, capability, or threat.

Intelligence assessment

A judgment about the likelihood, nature, or significance of something based on analysis of available information.

Microexpression

A brief, involuntary facial expression that occurs too quickly to be controlled and may reveal true emotion.

Pattern recognition

The ability to identify recurring structures or relationships in information or behavior.

Precursor

An action, behavior, or condition that typically precedes a significant event.

Protective intelligence

Intelligence gathered and analyzed to prevent harm to a specific person, group, or facility.

Sentinel

A person maintaining surveillance and physical security; a watchman or observer.

Situational awareness

The perception and understanding of what is happening in one's immediate environment.

Threat actor

An individual or group that poses a potential threat.

Threat assessment

A structured evaluation of the capability, intent, and likelihood of a threat.

Threat matrix

A structured representation of threat broken into component parts for analysis.

Tradecraft

The skills, techniques, and practices used in intelligence work.

Triangulation

The use of multiple independent sources or methods to verify information.

Volatility

The tendency of a situation, person, or relationship to change rapidly and unpredictably.

Watch

A period of observation or surveillance performed by a sentinel or team.

BACK MATTER

Further Reading

The following works were foundational to the ideas in this book and are recommended for readers who wish to explore these subjects in greater depth.

Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (6th ed.) (2017)
by Lowenthal, Mark M.
CQ Press

Understanding the Intelligence Cycle (2013)
by Phythian, Mark (ed.)
Routledge

Intelligence Power in Peace and War (2002)
by Herman, Michael
Cambridge University Press

Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap Between Research and Practice (2011)
by Marrin, Stephen
Routledge

Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence (3rd ed.) (2002)
by Shulsky, Abram N. and Schmitt, Gary J.
Potomac Books

Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf (Selected Readings in Espionage, Intelligence, & Related Subjects) (2013)

by Smith, Cathy

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

Battle Cries and Lullabies: Women in War from Prehistory to the Present (1998)

by De Pauw, Linda Grant

University of Oklahoma Press

M16: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service (2000)

by Dorril, Stephen

Free Press

THE SERIES

The MPSA Library Series

SENTINEL is Book Three of the MPSA Library Series: a collection of ten free reference books, one for each ribbon in the Mission Possible Spy Academy program. Each book provides the historical, scientific, and conceptual foundation for its corresponding ribbon course. They are companion volumes, not curriculum replacements. The courses teach tradecraft. The books explain why that tradecraft works: and how women have been using versions of it for centuries.

Book One: ANALYST

Analyst Ribbon

Environmental awareness, the evolutionary origins of female perceptual intelligence, historical operatives, and the architecture of learned helplessness.

Book Two: PROFILER

Profiler Ribbon

The science of behavioral reading: micro-expressions, baseline deviation, deception detection, and the history of women who read people for survival.

Book Three: SENTINEL

Sentinel Ribbon

Personal security and threat assessment: stalking patterns, target selection, pre-incident indicators, and the women who understood threat before it materialized.

Book Four: STRATEGIST

Strategist Ribbon

Strategic thinking, planning under uncertainty, decision science, and the women commanders and strategic thinkers history tried to forget.

Book Five: DIPLOMAT

Diplomat Ribbon

Influence, persuasion, social engineering, and negotiation: the intelligence of soft power and the women who wielded it.

Book Six: HANDLER

Handler Ribbon

Human intelligence, source development, trust and betrayal, and the women who ran networks of people in impossible conditions.

Book Seven: TACTICIAN

Tactician Ribbon

Operational planning, counter-surveillance, cover and concealment, and the tactical thinking that kept women alive in hostile environments.

Book Eight: GUARDIAN

Guardian Ribbon

Protective intelligence, close protection, emergency response, and the women who kept others safe when no one was keeping them safe.

Book Nine: GHOST

Ghost Ribbon

Deep cover, identity management, the psychology of invisibility, and the women who lived double lives and brought both home.

Book Ten: FIELD COMMANDER

Field Commander Ribbon

Leadership under fire, operational command, organizational intelligence, and the women who led when they were told they could not.

All ten books are free. All ten are available at MissionPossibleSpyAcademy.com.

MY NOTES

My Notes

MY NOTES: CONTINUED

MY NOTES: CONTINUED

MY NOTES: CONTINUED

My Notes: Continued

About the Author

Dr. Terry Oroszi is the founder and director of Mission Possible Spy Academy, based in Dayton, Ohio. A U.S. Army veteran and behavioral intelligence educator, her career spans academia, federal consulting, and national security. She has worked with women across the United States and internationally, including women surviving under conditions of extreme threat, to develop practical skills in awareness, self-protection, and resilience.

She began writing the MPSA curriculum in 2013, long before AI-assisted content generation existed, driven by one conviction: that the skills of intelligence professionals: honed by decades of field experience and research: belong to every woman who needs them. The MPSA Library Series makes these foundations freely available to every MPSA student, everywhere.

> *"I started writing in 2013: not because it was easy, but because it needed to be done. These women needed this. They still do."*
>
> Dr. Terry Oroszi



About Mission Possible Spy Academy

Mission Possible Spy Academy (MPSA) is an intelligence-training program founded by Dr. Terry Oroszi. MPSA teaches women: and men: the foundational skills of situational awareness, behavioral analysis, deception detection, strategic communication, and operational discipline. The curriculum draws from intelligence tradecraft, behavioral science, and applied psychology. Courses are delivered online and accessible globally. The MPSA Library Series provides free companion reading for all MPSA ribbon courses.

MissionPossibleSpyAcademy.com

Pro Bono Non Malo